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Reviewed by James Boyle

On the dust jacket of Roberto Unger's new book, Passion, is a
picture of Adam and Eve, their genitals covered by some fairly implausible greenery, being evicted from the Garden of Eden in considerable distress. At first blush the picture evokes the trinity of shame,
self-conscious sexuality, and lust that forms the perimeter of our ideas
about passion. After one has read Professor Unger's book, however,
the image is likely to evoke a different vision of passion, perhaps even
a different vision of personality and politics. The main theme of the
book is the conception of "infinite personality": the belief that the
ability to transcend "contexts," to go beyond the current arrangements
of self and society, lies at the very heart of being. Seen in the light
of this idea, the eviction of Adam and Eve can be understood as a
result of the original act of context-breaking: an assertion of infinite
possibilities that shatters a finite, if paradisiacal, social world. By
reversing the Sunday school story of the Fall, we can begin to understand both the reverence and the apparent heresy that inform Unger's
radicalism. The apple is the metaphor not simply for knowledge, but
for the knowledge of contingency: the arbitrary limitations imposed
by structures, whether of personality or of 3society. But if one puts it
that way, then Eve made the right choice.
This is a book written by a law professor about personality and
social thought, a book that draws its inspiration from modernism and
Christianity, its method from the great political theories of human
nature, and its power from the compelling stories about "ways of
being" that dot its pages. It begins with an eighty-nine-page methodological introduction and ends with a program for late twentieth
century psychiatry. There are, to put it mildly, a considerable number
of angles from which such a work could be reviewed. I have chosen
three. First, I attempt to summarize the ideas developed in the book
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and to describe how they relate to Professor Unger's larger work on
social theory. Second, I discuss the difficulties of building a political
theory on a conception of human nature, a procedure that modern
philosophy understands as involving the forbidden leap from fact to
value, from description to prescription. Third, I talk about modernism, the apocalyptic and subversive doctrine that gives this work
much of its "bite," but that also seems incompatible with the degree
of abstraction required of a speculative treatise on human nature. In
the conclusion I deal with the core of Unger's project, his attempt to
fuse the grandiosity of nineteenth century social thought with the
corrosive particularity of modernism.
I.
If there is a single "mood" that seems to unify contemporary visions
of self and society, it consists of the pervasive recognition of contextdependency. 4 The intellectual webs in which we create reality, and
the channels of routinized social power through which reality is created for us, have lost at least some of their transparent, natural
quality; they now appear as artificial and largely unchosen restraints
on the ways in which we can think and act. It is important to realize
that this is not merely an intellectual problem. By looking at all
mental structures as "contexts," we collapse the boundaries separating
the theoretical from the practical, the personal from the political. It
does not matter whether we are talking about the social construction
of reality, the ideas of Freudian psychiatry, the unspoken hierarchies
of the workplace, the implicit structure of a love affair, or the liberal
theory of the state. These are all arenas in which we face what
Professor Unger calls "the problem of contextuality": the ambivalent
experience of being (necessarily) embedded in a context that defines
the possible and the impossible, or separates sense from nonsense,
and, at the same time, of transcending that context - having momentary glimpses of ways of thinking and being that cannot even be
translated into, let alone adequately expressed by, the current vocabulary of social power or self-understanding.
The idea of the paradoxical status of contexts underscores the
importance of a more personal, existential dilemma: the awareness
that our relations with others are both necessary and threatening.
"We present to one another both an unlimited need and an unlimited
danger, and the very resources by which we attempt to satisfy the
4 Among the intellectual movements that have "context-dependency" as one of their central
preoccupations are Wittgensteinian linguistic theory, Mentalit6 history, hermeneutic philosophy,
thick-descriptive and structuralist anthropology, (some) literary criticism, nonpositivistic sociology, ethnology, and ethnomethodology. In view of its concentration on "situation sense," one
might even include legal realism.
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former aggravate the latter" (p. 2o). This "problem of solidarity"
could be seen as the cause of the problem of contextuality,5 but Unger
chooses to treat them as separate, though (obscurely) related phenomena, and it is around these two paradoxes that Passion revolves.
These paradoxes are also the key to the relationship between this book
and Unger's recent work on social theory.6 His theory of society which includes a detailed institutional plan describing how we might
open up the state to self-transformation - is premised on the ambiguous status of the contexts in which we confront the Other. Passion
represents his attempt to work out these ideas as they appear in the
interactions of everyday life. Unger needs to transpose the ideas to
the realm of "the personal" because "models of direct relations between
people form the elements of whole schemes of social life. Those
schemes are not realized and cannot be judged until they have been
changed into the small coin of personal encounter and experience" (p.
66).
In the introduction - which takes up the first third of the book
- Unger argues that it is possible to develop a normative conception
of personality, a conception that fuses description and prescription
without succumbing to either logical skepticism or sociological relativism. He begins with a series of extended stories about particular
artistic and theological visions of personality and works his way up
to a description of the Christian-romantic vision that provides the
7
conceptual raw material for his project.
The Christian-romantic vision of personality stresses two main
themes: "the primacy of personal encounter and of love as its re5 See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 21x(1979) (discussing the "fundamental contradiction that relations with others are both necessary to and incompatible with our freedom"). On the basis of Kennedy's article, one could
argue that this fundamental contradiction, in some sense, produces the modes of thought or
contexts (for instance, liberal legal theory) in which we obscure or "mediate" the cognitive
dissonance that the contradiction causes. At the same time, the contradiction ensures the
disruption of these contexts by constantly reappearing.
213

6 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561 (1983); R. Unger,

Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory (forthcoming).
7 Space does not permit a full account of Unger's compelling description of available images
of personality. These include the heroic ethic (pp. 53-55), the ethic of "fusion with the impersonal absolute" (pp. 57-62), Confucianism (pp. 65-67), and the Christian-romantic vision (pp.
22-39, 69-76). The first two fail because of their attempt to immunize the self from the dangers

posed by others (p. 62). Confucianism and the Christian-romantic vision, on the other hand,
offer us "corrigible" images of personality. Confucianism stresses the connection between the
personal and the political, the idea that others should be treated as ends, not means, and the
need to understand the interrelationship between the individual passions and a central telos, or
mode of being. The Christian-romantic vision is dealt with in the text. Unger takes these

themes and subjects them to "modernist criticism" in order to rid them of their one major defect:
a tendency to give a naturalized picture of the world, in which the provisional and temporary

arrangements of some social hierarchy are seen as reflective of a divine plan or human nature.
The ideas that remain are used to construct his account of the passions.
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demptive moment, and the commitment to social iconoclasm expressive of man's ineradicable homelessness in the world" (p. 24). By
connecting personal encounter with "virtue," the first theme supports
the idea of a teleological progress in which "[w]e advance in selfunderstanding and goodness by opening ourselves up to the whole life
of personal encounter rather than by seeking communion with an
impersonal, non-human reality" (p. 24). Unlike the picture offered by
Confucian philosophy - a "natural" order of personal roles, each
with its attendant virtues, through which people could achieve the
good - the Christian-romantic vision depends on "the willingness to
put personal attachments up for grabs" (p. 25).
By emphasizing this aspect of the Christian-romantic vision, Unger
lays the basis for his concentration on context-transcendence rather
than context-dependency. The mainspring of the passionate virtues is
clearly the urge to go beyond the context provided by established
forms of personal relations, intellectual inquiry, and social life. This
idea is picked up in the second theme of the Christian-romantic vision,
the "iconoclastic attitude toward particular social orders" (p. 25). Such
an attitude implies that "[tihe logic of claims that any given set of
social categories establishes must be overridden whenever it clashes
with an opportunity to extend further into personal expression or social
practice the qualities that are most fully realized in faith, hope, and
love" (p. 25).
In conjunction with the Christian-romantic vision, Unger develops
the notions of modernist criticism and context-smashing. The latter
two ideas are supposed to act as safeguards against theoretical complacency. By combining the rich texture of the Christian vision of
personality with the corrosive quality of modernism, Unger hopes to
wall-off the two counterclaims with which theories of human nature
must deal. First, there is the claim that it is not logically possible to
deduce norms from facts. Second, there is the claim that it is not
sociologically possible to give a nonrelativistic description of human
nature. Unger must deal with both of these arguments simultaneously
because their combined force has converted the genre in which he is
writing - the speculative treatise on human nature - from the
universal language for descriptions of the good life, into a literary
curiosity, known best to intellectual historians and first-year philosophy students.
At its most abstract level, the argument Unger uses to deal with
these two critiques is simply a double negative. He turns the claim
that everything is contingent back on itself. Thus, he can argue that
because no vision of society and no conception of personality can
exhaust or fully express human potential, there does seem to be a
nonrelative facet of personality: its capacity constantly to transcend
the limits of the possible or the desirable - limits demarcated by the
reigning "context" of intellectual and social life. The only noncontin-
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gent phenomenon is contingency itself, and "infinite personality" appears to be contingency clad in the robes of human nature. Whether
this argument actually overcomes the fact/value dichotomy is a more
complex issue, one I will take up in the next section.
In the main part of the book, Unger presents his discourses on the
passions. The passions are the noninstrumental dealings we have with
other people, the modes of being that organize and are organized
around the antinomy of "need and danger" at the heart of our relations
with others. Unger's account does not present the passions as merely
a "dangerous supplement" to either reason or social life (pp. ioi-o5).
Rather, it is that the passions provide the personal context for the
problem of solidarity; they "ring the changes on the relations between
our reciprocal and infinite longing for one another and our reciprocal
and infinite terror" (p. ioo). In exploring this context, Unger moves
beyond the method that the bell-ringing analogy suggests; his account
does not simply run through the list of possible variations on terror
and longing, but develops the passions as biographical and conceptual
mediators of the existential contradiction between our need and our
fear of other people, the mundane incarnations of the antinomy between self and others. These incarnations range from the major responses of love and hate, through the "proto-social passions" of lust
and despair, to the minor variants of faith, hope, and trust, envy,
pride, and jealousy. Each passion is lescribed so as to bring out not
only its connection to the antinomy of longing and jeopardy (the
problem of solidarity), but also its expression of both context-dependence and context-transcendence (the problem of contextuality). Lust,
for example, not only embodies the sense of need and danger with
which we confront others, but also expresses our simultaneous inability to exist without, or to exist completely within, a given context of
personal possibilities.
From this double dialectic of fear and longing, conformity and
transcendence, Unger builds to his conclusion. The Siren-songs of
our vices are revealed as ambiguous phenomena that owe much of
their allure to the context-smashing impulses to which they give a
perverse form. Conversely, it is the passionate virtues that enable us
to go beyond the limits of current arrangements, to "discover the
extraordinary within the ordinary"; it is these on which "the good life"
is founded. The alternative strategy of withdrawal from the shocks
and dangers of social life does not enable us to solve the problem of
solidarity. "The more a person indulges in a concern for defense,
distancing and disinvolvement, the more he denies himself the resources for self-construction and self-transformation; he becomes the
master of an empty citadel" (p. 125). Instead, those who have learned
the lesson of the passions must accept the heightened mutual vulnerability that is the prerequisite to transformation. In their "ardor and
gentleness" (p. 271), they have discovered that "[s]alvation through
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the acceptance of vulnerability is the only kind of salvation there
really is" (p. 300).
In the appendix Unger provides "A Program for Late TwentiethCentury Psychiatry." Threading his way through the debate between
psychiatrists and anti-psychiatrists, behaviorists and neurobiologists,
he uses the problems of contextuality and solidarity, and their mediation by the passions, as the key to an understanding of mental illness.
Once again, need and fear, conformity and transcendence, form the
horizontal and vertical axes of explanation.
But recognition of the problems of solidarity and contextuality is
the smallest part of Unger's program. By demonstrating the contingency of the conceptual structures within which we define both reality
and sanity, these problems show that the task of policing the boundaries of a socially created "reason" is an eminently "political" one.
The very idea of modernist context-smashing on which Unger's essay
depends should make us aware that the "false-necessities," generated
by the structure of social reality, will be replicated inside the psychoanalytic theories that we offer as maps to those who have somehow
become estranged from that structure. For example, in most schools
of conventional psychiatry the extruded person is encouraged to reintegrate himself into the social framework of understanding through a
conceptual maze of explanation that mirrors, and thus rigidifies, the
society to which it acts as the reentry point. In other words, psychoanalytic theory offers opportunities to replicate, but not to transform, individual and social contexts.
This critique of psychoanalysis closes the circle opened at the
beginning of this section. We have returned to the central theme of
Unger's social theory - an expansion of the possibilities for the selfrevision of structures, whether those structures are conceptual, institutional, or interpersonal. The next question to consider is whether
the idea of infinite personality and the goal of increasing the plasticity
of structures can somehow be combined in such a way as to allow
Unger to overcome the apartheid that contemporary philosophy maintains between fact and value. If he cannot do so, there will be a
disjunction between his descriptions of human personality and his
political prescriptions for the good life.
11.
If there is one intellectual debate that rivals in sterility and repetitiveness the jurisprudential quest for the essence of law, it is the
perennial attempt by moral philosophers to disassemble, or at least
circumvent, Hume's Guillotine. 8 This piece of philosophical cutlery
8

The most noteworthy recent attempt that comes to mind is Alasdair Maclntyre's

1981

book, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theology, in which the author offers a subtle and powerful
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is the metaphor that guards the boundary between the realm of facts
and the realm of values and that asserts that the only passport between
the two is a (logically disreputable) leap of faith. One cannot induce
or deduce a norm (people should not fly) from a fact (people do not
have wings), or vice versa. This makes moral and political theories
based on human nature a rather dubious proposition. An opponent
of one's theory can claim that it links selective description to political
prescription by means of an arbitrary assumption.
Passion contains both an affirmation and a denial of the importance of Hume's Guillotine and of the separation that it implies between fact and value and consequently between personality and politics. I will deal first with the element of denial because it is the most
obvious part of Unger's work. On the very first page Unger tells us
that his major methodological concern "is to reconceive and reconstruct the ancient and universal practice of attributing normative force
to conceptions of personality or society so that this practice can better
withstand the criticisms that philosophy since Hume or Kant has
leveled against it" (p. vii). One could not ask for a clearer rebellion
against the hegemony of the fact/value dichotomy. Yet, as the next
few paragraphs may show, the way in which this rebellion is to be
brought off is rather more obscure.
In the first section I pointed out that, at the most abstract level,
Unger's argument seems to take the form of a double negative. The
only noncontingent aspect of personality is precisely its contingent
character, the fact that it always transcends the boundaries provided
by the currently possible or imaginable forms of life. On the level of
moral theory, Unger uses this double-negative argument as the basis,
first, of a critique and, then, of a reconstruction of the available
normative images of personality. He argues that if we take these
images of human nature and "purge" them of the parts that tend to
deny the infinite quality of personality, we will discover that the
remaining theoretical ideas "converge." By "convergence" Unger
seems to mean that these images tend to draw closer together, that
they give us similar answers to our questions. This idea of "convergence" allows him to use the abstract (and definitionally contentless?)
idea that personality is infinite as support for the concrete assertions
about vices and virtues offered by the Christian-romantic vision.
Viewed this way, Unger's argument about moral theory has two main
parts. The concept of infinite personality seems to allow us to skirt
relativism, while the idea of "convergence" apparently offers us good
reason to believe in the Christian vision and thus allows us to skirt
not only relativism but contentlessness as well.
history of moral philosophy, but follows it with a less powerful attempt to overcome the fact/
value dichotomy by appealing to a neo-Aristotelian teleology. See also D. HUME, A TREATISE
oF HUMAN NATURE (London 1740).
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On the level of moral action, Unger seems to rely on the idea that
we proceed toward the good by (virtuous) context-transcendence (p.
89). If we synthesize the levels of theory and action (which I probably
should never have separated), we are left with the idea that we are
most empowered, most truly ourselves, and thus most truly good,
when we engage in context-transcending activity that is informed by
the virtues embodied in the Christian-romantic vision. In other
words, by knowing "who we are" we will know, in part, what we
should do - this is a perfect example of what Unger calls "the
classical style of argument." In relying on this kind of argument,
Unger is obviously rebelling against the modern conviction that facts
and norms must be kept separate. Why does he do so?
Unger hopes to make three points by using this chastened "classical" style of argument, which attributes normative force to conceptions of personality: first, that there are phenomena in which description and prescription are fused; second, that personality is just such
a phenomenon; and third, that a philosophical method committed to
separating fact and value will consequently be both wasteful of a great
tradition of theories of human nature and ultimately mistaken. The
last point brings us back to the concept of "converging" images of
personality - a convergence that Unger thinks we would be wrong
to ignore.
I believe that, despite their subtlety, neither the argument about
"convergence" nor Unger's defense of the classical style of theorizing
is capable of avoiding the problem posed by Hume's Guillotine. The
argument about "convergence" is particularly fraught with problems.
Unger claims that he is not relying on some idea of an overarching
moral order (p. 5o), but it is hard to see how one can identify moral
"convergence" without using some sort of noncontingent metaphysical
grid as a measuring device. Compare this idea of convergence to the
type of argument for which Unger criticizes existentialist metaphysicians like Sartre and Heidegger. "[A] metaphysic," he says, "projects
a view of subjectivity and intersubjectivity into a picture of ultimate
reality and then pretends to derive from this projection the very image
of man that had originally inspired the metaphysical account" (p. 82).
Are the problems Unger identifies with the typical metaphysical argument so different from those faced by his own picture of the convergence of "chastened" images of personality? These images were
supposed to converge (though they represent no underlying ultimate
reality), and they are neither reducible to, nor descriptive of, an
essence of human nature (even a "negative" one). Could Unger be
"projecting a view of personality" onto the "corrigible" visions of
human nature - and then pretending to derive from these visions
the very image of personality that inspired the original account?
So much for "convergence." What of Unger's defense of a revised
form of the classical style of argument, a style that simply attributes
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normative force to conceptions of personality? I found this part of
Passion confusing. Unger seems to claim that the classical style he
proposes is different from an Aristotelian teleology (p. 45) - which
would assert that "things tend toward a purpose natural to them and
that the achievement of this purpose is their good" (p. 44). Yet at the
end of the introduction, in explaining why we should live in the way
his essay suggests, he gives as reasons the two propositions that "this
is the kind of being we really are and . . . [that] by living in this
fashion we empower ourselves individually and collectively" (p. 89).
I do not object to the conjunction of these reasons, but when Unger
then argues that both of them "state the same thesis under different
names" (p. 89), it becomes hard to differentiate his argument from
the Aristotelian one.
If we leave aside Unger's attempt to circumvent the fact/value
dichotomy and we concentrate instead on his direct attack on Hume,
we are left with three main points. The first is an appeal to the
traditionexemplified by the classical style (pp. 39-43). The invocation
of such a tradition would appear ironic in a book devoted to the
transcendence of contexts and conventions were it not for Unger's
apparent desire to revise the classical method in order to rid it of its
closed, naturalistic tendencies. The second part of the argument is
the claim that the problem posed by Hume's Guillotine arises only if
we operate within a paradigm of rationality that divides the world
into a realm of facts and a realm of values (p. 41). Thus, according
to the third part of the argument, the Guillotine simply leaves us in
the position of saying, "Why should we draw normative conclusions
from factual premises?" This is a question to which Unger responds,
in the language of Camus and Didion, "Why shouldn't we?" 9 - and
then twists the knife by adding his suspicion that we cannot help but
do SO (pp. 3, 42).
If we look closely at this three-part argument, it seems to share
the defects of Unger's idea of "convergence." Neither the claim that
the only noncontingent phenomenon is contingency itself, nor adherence to a revamped "classical" style, can provide Unger with an
epistemologically unassailable way to bypass Hume's Guillotine. The
former offers an aprioristfc basis for theorizing only as long as one
does not give any content to the vision of infinite personality - but
that is exactly what Unger is trying to do. The latter method depends
on a rejection of the fact/value dichotomy as a way of thinking about
the world. This is quite conceivable, but it would seem to be a
dubious basis for authority (all the other theorists could claim the
same rejection) even if Unger did not appear to rely on that dichotomy
elsewhere in the book (pp. vii, 40-41, 46, 87). I am daring to dismiss
9 A. CAmus, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1955); J. DIDION, PLAY IT As

IT LAYS 213 (1970).
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these complex arguments in so cavalier a fashion only because I
believe that Unger has available to him an alternative set of arguments
that justify his project and that are more compatible with its modernist
ideas. Paradoxically, in order to develop these arguments we need to
turn away from Unger's attempt to avoid Hume's Guillotine and
toward the part of his work that actually seems to support Hume and
Kant in their criticisms of "political theories of human nature."
The standard use of a normative theory of personality is to establish one particular form of social arrangement as "naturally" the best.
Hobbes, for example, argues from an avowedly scientific conception
of human appetites and an analytic conception of power, to a normative conception of the state - a conception that justifies a particular form of government. 10 Because human appetites are potentially
limitless, and because an individual's ability to satisfy her appetites
consists in the excess of her power over .everyone else's, we must have
an unchallengeable central government. The dangling and apparently
uncontroversial value-choice ("if we prefer order over chaos") is tucked
straight back into the conception of human nature. If we are as
Hobbes described us, we cannot help but have that preference.
It is against this kind of "closed" theory of human nature, which
moves from the fixed properties of personality to the canonical form
of society, that Unger deploys the notion of infinite human potential.
If the most salient feature of personality is its capacity to go beyond
all forms of social life, to transcend any setting in which it is however
briefly embedded, then the resulting attitude has the same corrosive
consequences for closed theories of human nature that Hume's Guillotine had for all theories of human nature.
A closer analysis of the last point may provide a clue to a possible
alternative justification of Unger's project. One could argue that the
notion of infinite personality deals with the same phenomena on the
existential level that Hume's Guillotine dealt with on the logical level.
By this I mean only that most skepticism about theories of human
nature is actually fueled by the mundane discovery that everyone's
personality is both complex and contradictory. Consider the social
Darwinian theories that purported to deduce a justification for laissezfaire capitalism from an analysis of the "essentially" competitive qualities of human nature. This kind of theory is certainly easy to debunk
by using Hume's Guillotine. But I would claim that such debunking
really owes its convincing quality to our own "lived experience" that
competitiveness is only one of the "golden swarm" of contradictory
qualities that makes up human life. It is this "lived experience," more
than any logical pyrotechnics, that tends to undermine the bridge
between the factual description of human nature and the normative
prescription of moral consequences.
10 See T. HOBBES, LEvIATHAN (London 165).
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Thus, it is precisely our personal awareness of the other modes of
being, suppressed by a closed claim about the essence of human
nature, that gives the fact/value dichotomy its argumentative power.
This is made particularly obvious if one contrasts Hume's moral skepticism with his critique of causation and inductive reasoning. The
"problem of induction" - that no amount of prior experience can
give us logical grounds for predicting the future - was potentially
just as debilitating to the empiricist/scientific project as Hume's Guillotine has been to moral reasoning. But in the absence of lived
experience to which it could be connected, the problem of induction
remained as merely a philosophical brain-teaser that empiricists
warned us to ignore, for without induction "science is impossible."'"
The fact/value dichotomy, on the other hand, is an appealing argumentative device precisely because it is grounded on the everyday
discovery that our categories for understanding personality or personalities are doomed to be nonexhaustive and thus that any moral or
political judgment we draw from them is arbitrarily exclusive.
But how does all this help us? If Unger cannot prove that his
moral vision is the right one, can he not simply offer reasons why we
should look with sympathy on his attempt to construct a normative
theory? He could, for instance, point out that his theory does three
things that others fail to do. First, it deals with our everyday experience of the infinite quality of personality. Second, it links this
experience to an aversion to closed theories of human nature. Third,
it uses the first and second points to explain why Hume's Guillotine
seems to work so well.
Unger, however, does not use the form of justification I have just
outlined. He rejects the pragmatist method of "offering reasons" (p.
43). He claims that these reasons "achieve determinancy [sic] only to
the extent that they continue, covertly, to invoke a substantive image
of human nature" (p. 43). This argument seems inconsistent with
both the fact that Unger actually does offer such reasons in support
of his vision (pp. 84-87) and the fact that, even if "infinite personality"
is not a "substantive image of human nature," the Christian-romantic
embodiment that Unger gives it certainly is. Consequently, I think
Unger should rely not on some reformulated classical style of argument, but on the reasons and the experiences that actually make that
argument convincing.
In this section, I have argued that Unger fails to circumvent
Hume's Guillotine in the sense that he does not prove that his political
vision is required by the nature of personality. But if we abandon
the search for some new source of this proof, we are still left with a
powerful set of reasons in favor of the attempt to create a normative
conception of personality. And from the range of reasons that Unger
11B.

RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 674 (1972).
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could give us, perhaps the most important is that he offers to deal
with the concrete experiences that expose the procrustean nature of
any closed theory of personality. This is an important offer because
these are the very experiences that have given critical salience to
Hume's abstract proposition in deontology by weaving multiple instances of its confirmation into the fabric of social life.
The same point could be made in another way. Unger is simply
more convincing when he concentrates on experience and on the
politics of everyday life, rather than on the formal logical categories
for producing truth. It is the small-scale phenomenologies of aspiration that are the most persuasive part of his attempt to undermine
"closed" theories of personality and to erect his own version of the
infinite potential of the human spirit. I have stressed this small-scale,
anti-formalist aspect of Unger's argument because it is more than just
a pragmatist moral theory. It provides the raw material for the modernist vision of the world.
II.
The greater part of Passion consists of Professor Unger's attempt
to use modernism in two interlocking ways. He enlists its subversive
tendencies to criticize (and thus strengthen) the Christian and Confucian conceptions of personality, and simultaneously he employs it in
its own right as the source of a flawed but redeemable vision of the
good life. But what is the modernist "mood," and how can it provide
2
the basis for a social theory?'
The modernist picture of society is best captured in the famous
phrase from the Communist Manifesto - "all that is solid melts into
air."13 But modernism seems to offer a perspective on this picture of
'(social evaporation" that is different from the one provided by the
authors of the Manifesto. Rather than concentrate on some particular
feature of society - on the interests of a class, or the "nature" of an
institution - the modernist vision focuses on the process of change
and dissolution itself. In a similar vein, the modernist movement in
art was less an argument for a particular style than a reaction against
the traditional modes of artistic representation. The classical "forms"
of beauty, such as representational painting and the nineteenth century
novel, had once seemed to be the natural and traditional contexts for
12 Some background works on modernism are D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS
OF CAPITALISM 46-84 (1978); M. BERMAN, ALL THAT Is SOLID MELTS INTO AIR (1982); E.
LUNN, MARXISM AND MODERNISM (1982); MODERNISM 1890-I93o (M. Bradbury & J. Mc-

Farlane eds. 1976); S. SPENDER, THE STRUGGLE OF THE MODERN: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF
LumAcs, BRECHT, BENJAMIN, AND ADORNO (1963).
13 K. MARx & F. ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), reprinted in

THE MARX-ENGELS READER 335, 338 (R. Tucker ed. 1972). See generally M. BERMN, supra
note I2.

1078

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98=i66

expression. But modernists portrayed them as rigid and limiting conceptual boxes, impediments to the communication of experience.
The attack on traditional artistic modes of expression was easily
transferable to social "forms," such as codes of etiquette, moral injunctions, and political or familial institutions. In other words, these
social forms were seen as a barrier to self-realization, just as the
artistic traditions were seen as a barrier to art, and they were condemned in the same terms - as an outdated straitjacket that distorted
human potential by repressing instinctual desires. Our available repertoire of metaphors for understanding the social world is chock-full
of these subversive modernist insights. Unger tries to draw on this
shared background of modernist ideas in order to present his argument
about forms of life, societies, and particular visions of personality. All
of these socially constructed contexts can lay some claim to being
necessary for communication; the Tower of Babel offers a metaphorical reminder of what happens when a shared "context" is completely
shattered. Yet as Unger points out, none of these contexts is capable
of adequately expressing the infinite potential of human personality.
Each context can only hint at the possible ways of life suppressed
beneath the glassy sheen of a naturalized social world.
This feeling that the infinite is somehow imprisoned within the
finite gives rise to a deep rage against the existing order - whether
of society, or art, or self-understanding - and to a corresponding joy
in undermining that order. Unger wants to incorporate this exaltation
of context-smashing into his ideas, but first he feels he must rid it of
some of its Dionysian and apocalyptic rage. He argues that a person
who adopts such a purely modernist view inevitably rejects the possibility of any kind of fulfilling communal life because she cannot
admit the context-dependency that it would imply, or take the risks
of heightened mutual vulnerability that it would involve (p. 63).
Daniel Bell puts the issue in a more disapproving light as he muses
on the disruption that modernism has implied for "the bourgeois world
view":
The deepest nature of modern man, the secret of his soul as revealed
by the modern metaphysic, is that he seeks to reach out beyond
himself; knowing that negativity -

death -

is finite, he refuses to

accept it. Behind the chiliasm of modern man is the megalomania of
self-infinitization. In consequence, the modern hubris is in the refusal
to accept limits, the insistence on continually reaching out; and the
modern world proposes a destiny that is always beyond: beyond morality, beyond tragedy, beyond culture.14
Where Bell sees a sinfully proud, millenial fervor that has shattered
the middle-class values of "common sense" and deferred gratification,
14 D. BELL, supra note 12, 49-50 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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Unger sees a perverted but corrigible version of "infinite personality"
that has tried - and failed - to solve the problem of contextuality
through resort to total denial. In the place of this total denial, Unger
offers us a chastened brand of modernism - one that accepts the
inevitability (and even the desirability) of the limitations imposed by
the cultural context in which one is embedded, yet insists nonetheless
on the possibility of self-realization, the assertion of the infinite within
the confines of the finite.
This brings us to the first major difficulty Unger has to face. There
is a terrible danger that his ideas are going to be turned into some
kind of cosmic balancing test, in which we weigh context-revision and
context-reliance with our metaphysical thumbs clamped subtly, but
firmly, on the side of revision. It would be tragic to see this trenchant
and subtle thinker relegated to the post-realist law professor's heaven
a distinctively dispassionate realm where a contentless "freedom"
is forever being "balanced" against an equally contentless "security."
Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make trivial.
Unger escapes trivialization by weaving phenomenological description into the abstract categories of his epistemological and social theory. His overall project is to give content to the concept of infinite
personality through a biographical account of self-assertion, through
a social theory that describes the possibilities for the "expanded selfrevision" of social and philosophical structures, and through, a set of
stories that link self-assertion to social theory by means of a "thick
description" of the available ways of thinking about personality. Passion is mainly concerned with the first and third components of the
project: the more general social theory is still to come. But something
about this overall theoretical method seems to contradict the subversive and insurrectionary doctrine that it propounds. To be sure, the
evocative stories about "ways of being" that fill the pages of Passion
are a far cry from the Spinozan latticework of epistemological argument that characterizes Unger's earlier works.' 5 Even so, there is a
lurking element of paradox. An enterprise such as Unger's seeks to
translate the interstitial reality of passionate encounter into the abstract language of social theory and, in doing so, finds itself imaginatively committed to a world of outrageous acts and everyday
rebellions 16 that it can describe, but never create.
Consider, for example, Unger's theory of the state. Oppositional
ideologies such as classical republicanism and revolutionary Marxism
describe a concrete set of arrangements for the state and thus define
the utopian goal of a remade social world. Unger's modernist theory
Is R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY

(1976).
16 The phrase is Gloria Steinem's, I believe. See G. STEINEM, OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND
EVERYDAY REBELLIONS (1983).
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of the state, on the other hand, depends on the destabilization rights
that would undermine existing social arrangements and break up
structures of hierarchy before they could solidify. 17 Whereas the standard oppositional theories specify the content of the good life, Unger's
vision specifies only the process of social change. Theoretical shifts
such as this may seem unpromising; post-realist legal thought has
shuffled uneasily from content to process in a vain attempt to shake
off the specter of contingency. 18 But leaving aside the analogy to legal
theory, one is still struck by a vague dissonance if one compares this
large-scale theory of social transformation to the localized guerilla
warfare that modernists have waged on the small-scale hierarchies of
the workplace, as well as on artistic forms and social conventions.
Perhaps it is unfair to concentrate on the most abstract side of
Unger's theory. But even when we turn to the "personal" stories of
Passion, there are times when his beautifully allegorical prose seems
to sit uneasily on top of the concrete social experiences that it evokes.
It is true that our experiences of workplace conflict and personal
trauma can be given new meaning by the abstract description of
"context-breaking" and of the dialectic between "need and fear." It
is true that Unger's finely crafted stories are almost mocking in their
ability to capture the contradictory visions of our own personality that
we have confidently espoused at one time or other. But there is a
residual felt-reality, a trace of the passionate particularity of our own
experiences that is somehow unrecognized by the book, yet still exercises a shadowy and subversive power, like a disgraced relative
whose absence from family photographs must nevertheless be explained. Maybe it is only to be expected that a book about contextsmashing should tend to undermine the "context" of its own style.
Confronting this dissonance in Unger's work, I find myself torn
between two contradictory beliefs. It does seem that the existential
truth on which we slap the label "modernism" cannot be adequately
captured in fhe abstiact language of social theory. Precisely because
it is an existential truth, it can be found only in the actual search for
freedom that goes on in the interstices of every institution and every
experience of social life. There are no modernist theses. There is
only the anarchistic and joyful refusal to invest one's hopes in some
future utopia and a consequent commitment to work where one is 17 See Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, supra note 6, at 6oo. For more on this
point, see id. at 583-602, 6ii-iS.
18 See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980);
J. ELY, DEMOcRAcY AND DISTRUST (i980); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process (tent. ed.
1958). For the clearest critique of process theory, see Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory
and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (i98i). There is, however, a crucial difference between
Unger's project and that of the process theorists. Whereas they use process to deny contingency,
Unger is trying to heighten the feeling that social structures are contingent, and thus to open
them up to transformation.

J1985]

BOOK REVIEW

1081

"willingly pay[ing] the price for the inconformity of vision to circumstance." 19 But even as I feel a preference for the everyday, localized
practice of these ideas, I am aware that I am not giving due weight
to a belief in the seductive side of Unger's project - the large-scale
theory of small-scale transformation, which aims to increase the plasticity of social structures by converting the state from a source of
stability into a source of change. The differences between these two
ways of looking at the world can be exaggerated. The local, joyous
anarchism and the abstract, deconstructive theory of the state do share
at least one thing: they agree that the personal is political. It is a
measure of Unger's contribution that he has turned "passion," long
considered a mainspring of both (irrational) politics and (sentimental)
personal life, into a bridge between the two.
IV.
When I started on this review, I saw it as a chance to refine my
thoughts about how one connects social theory to personal life. I felt
that the grip of the grand social theories, such as Marxism, had been
weakened to such an extent that most intellectual and political discussions were dominated by proponents of either "active" or "tragic"
modernism. The tragic modernist sees all action as problematic, given
the absence of any ultimate grounding for her ideas. The only thing
left to do is to lean back, cultivate one's ennui, and watch the free
play of signifiers across the pages of The New York Review of Books.
The active modernist, on the other hand, sees the absence of a grounding as a liberating rather than a.demobilizing phenomenon. By undermining both social and conceptual authoritarianism, this absence
provides a momentary opening for other ways of being and other
forms of life. In response to the question "But how shall we know
what action to take and which forms of life we should support?" the
active modernist has two deceptively simple answers. First, we will
proceed in the way we have always done, in a partial and selfreferential discourse that is not completely nullified simply because we
have abandoned its pretensions to absolute validity. Second, by concentrating on our own "localities," on our concrete experiences of love,
truth, and power, we will find that the conceptual grandiosity of
abstract philosophy and social theory is but one style of thought about
moral action, and not the most attractive style at that. But how does
all of this apply to Unger? He is clearly not a tragic modernist; the
question is, is he a modernist at all?
Unger seems to have it both ways. His ideas have the grand
sweep and confident style of nineteenth century social theory, but as
I have tried to show, they also seem quintessentially modernist; the
19Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, supra note 6, at 674.
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"deepest structure" that his work reveals is "the certainty of chance." 2 0°
The general thesis of this review is that this tension in Unger's work
is important, and that the aspect of his ideas I have chosen to label
"modernist" is more instructive than his abstract moral philosophy or
his deconstructive social theory. In the main body of the review, I
tried to show how this tension manifests itself. Thus, in the section
on Hume, I argued that Unger would be best advised to abandon his
justification and revision of the classical style of normative argument
and instead to concentrate on the concrete existential experiences that
make Hume's Guillotine a convincing argumentative weapon. When
I turned to modernism itself, I argued that Unger's aim of creating a
large-scale social theory seemed inconsistent with the corrosive, localized critiques more typical of modernist activity in art and politics.
Given the brutal simplifications necessitated by lack of space, a
reader might take me to be saying that there is a "thing" called
"modernism" and that Unger is misusing it. I do not intend to put
forward such a stupid idea; I seek only to offer an opinion on how
Passion is to be read. Are we to see this book as a description of the
essence of human nature, or as a source of aspirational stories through
which we can explain our own local moral and political struggles?
Are we to understand Unger's argument as a quasi-teleology that
avoids the fact/value dichotomy or as an insider's report on the experiences that undermine "closed" visions of the good life? There is
no uniquely correct reading of a book, and Unger could quite justifiably claim that I am setting up false dichotomies. Nevertheless, for
me the exciting aspect of Passion comes from its ambivalent but
pronounced connection to the politics of everyday life, a connection
that implicitly plays down the essence of human nature, the abstract
social theory, and even the epistemological analysis for which his
earlier work, Knowledge and Politics, is so justly famous.
This is allvery well, and the reader may even be convinced by a
few fragments of particular arguments. But why the general preference for the small-scale, localized vision of political and moral theory?
It is hard to answer this question within the dry conventions of
traditional analytic writing. Perhaps the easiest way to do so is to
dissect the actual experience of dealing with political thought. There
is a subliminal awareness that theoretical works such as Passion may
depend on a collective suspension of disbelief. Can a book, the mundane product of the workaday world of an academic (particularly a
legal academic), really be big enough to fit the enormous romanticized
space reserved in our mental classification system for "theories of
20 The "certainty of chance" was the phrase Andr6 Breton used to describe both modernism
and his own philosophy of life. Breton was a pioneer of surrealism who led the modernist
challenge to the "context" of traditional writing styles. See A. BRETON, MANIFESTOES OF
SURREALISM (1969); A. BRETON, NADJA (1928).
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human nature"? More important, perhaps, can it really mean anything outside the neat to-and-fro of academic debate? One knows, of
course, that there once were people who wrote about human nature
and that their writing did have political consequences - but that was
then, not now. Anyway, they were the famous ones, like Hobbes or
Rousseau, and the disabling feelings of ordinariness that they may
have felt about their work are hidden from us by the enabling myths
of history. We have been bequeathed their ideas, and if political
theory seems to be something that is simultaneously intimidating and
irrelevant to our own lives, we can obscure that vague unease, talk
as though we were "doing it," and still produce truth convincingly by
manipulating the received learning, Perhaps the book made from our
discussions of Hume's Guillotine and modernism will be read by
others; maybe it will affect them.
The late-night angst of the troubled political theorist that fills the
preceding paragraph actually points out an important truth. There is
no easy way to make sense of your life if you accept a mental division
of labor in which you produce truth for consumption by others. This
is particularly true if you believe that the "personal" and the "political"
are inseparable, but such a belief cuts two ways. As cynical moderns,
we may have lost the enabling (and pernicious) myth of "the great
thinker thinking great thoughts," but we have gained "the politics of
everyday life." We have come to see that our theoretical ideas are
meaningful only insofar as they reflect, and reflect back upon, our
mundane political struggles. These struggles are important because
any commitment to social transformation must begin in the fine texture
of our relations with others. The forms of domination against which
the activist lawyer deploys her skills reappear in her workplace and
may even be more secure there because they are covered over by the
protective veil of familiarity. The mind/body distinction that a teacher
deconstructs in the classroom reappears in his relation to his secretary.
Power does not tidily confine itself to the public sphere and the pages
of The Washington Post. It suffuses our most intimate relationships
with those we love, for we are all erotic politicians in the end. If
there is a central insight that guides Roberto Unger's work, it is this.
So Passionshould not be seen as merely the abstract "human nature"
component of an academic social theory. It is an attempt to work out
the elements of morality and power involved in our noninstrumental
dealings with others. It is a dispatch from the front, not a treatise
on war.

